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DAVID PAYS FOR GOLIATH'S MISTAKES:
THE COSTLY EFFECT SARBANES-OXLEY
HAS ON SMALL COMPANIES
NATHAN WILDA*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Haste and rashness are storms and tempests, breaking and
wrecking business; but nimbleness is a full, fair wind, blowing it
with speed to the heaven.'

Over a year has passed since one of the most comprehensive
corporate reform bills was written into law. 2 Congress passed the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 3 ("Act") on July 29, 2002 in response to some
4
of the most devastating corporate scandals in American history.
Congress had not faced a crisis like this since the Great
Depression, when the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 were
formed. 5 President George W. Bush declared that the Act included
"the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices
. J.D., The John Marshall Law School, January 2005.
1. Thomas Fuller (1608-1661), http://www.nonstopenglish.com/reading
/quotations/AThomas-Fuller.asp?page=3 (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
2. Jennifer S. Recine, Note, Examination of the White Collar Crime
Penalty Enhancements in the Sarbanes-OxleyAct, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1535,
1535 (2002). The government had not reacted to a situation in corporate
America like this since the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934. Id.
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
[hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act] (codified as amended in scattered sections of
title 15 of the U.S. Code) (enacting a broad range of provisions to assist in the
governance of publicly traded companies).
4. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn:
Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (andIt Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915,
923-28 (2003) (addressing the history of securities legislation). The vast
corporate scandals, the extent of financial losses to employees and
stockholders of the companies involved, and the pressure the public put on a
conglomerate of elected officials, all led to the "sweeping reform" known as
Sarbanes-Oxley. Id. at 917 n.1.
5. See Robert W. Hamilton, The Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002
Style, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003). Modern securities regulation was born in
1933 and 1934 in the wake of the Depression. However, before enacting the
Securities Acts, Congress carefully studied and considered the pending
legislation; the same cannot be said of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Id. at
5 n.11.
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since the time of Franklin Delano Roosevelt."6
However, critics of the Act describe it as a "hasty, panicked
reaction of an electorate looking for an easy fix to the apparent
'problem' that stock prices go down as well as up."7 Congress
reacted to the public's outrage and dwindling confidence in
corporate America by enacting legislation "quickly and without a
lot of study," thus creating unintended consequences.8
This Comment reviews the provisions of the Act that are
causing small companies to struggle to remain engaged in the
public market. Part II reviews the events that unfolded in
corporate America in late 2001 and early 2002. Part III discusses
the public pressure on the federal government to enact new
corporate reform measures. Part IV analyzes the implementation
of the Act, as well as the provisions of the Act that are forcing
many small companies to consider privatization. Finally, Part V
introduces a proposal to exempt small companies from certain
provisions of the Act in order to foster entrepreneurship.

II. THE POWER

OF GREED

In order to establish the basis for Congress' decision to pass
the Act, it is important to understand the events leading up to this
"sweeping reform."9 After a slight downturn in the financial
markets in the mid-1980s, investors enjoyed a steady incline for
more than ten years, due in large part to the invention of the
Internet, the development of technology, and the unprecedented
growth in telecommunications. 10 The public's attitude toward
6. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2002, at Al. President Bush's attempt at reforming
corporate America and his solution to the problems that arose in the
numerous corporate scandals was signing the Sarbanes-Oxley bill.
Id.
Democrats were quick to point out that the Bush Administration had been
forced into signing the bill, however, the issue corralled both political parties
in the face of concerns that voters would hold them responsible for corporate
fraud and plummeting stock prices. Id.
7. Hamilton, supra note 5, at 49. Professor Larry Ribstein believes that
the Act will not prevent future frauds from occurring any more than the old
regulations, and stated the Act will have a "significant chance of imposing
substantial costs." Id. Professor Ribstein believes that there is a price to
having free markets, and falling stock prices and corporate mistakes are part
of that price. Id. at 50.
8. Anthony Lin, One Year After Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Many Officers See
Need, but Grumble Nonetheless, N.Y.L.J., July 31, 2003, at 1. Executives
recognized that reform was needed, but the Act is full of onerous requirements
that will divert resources and executives away from the activities and
responsibilities important to a successful enterprise. Id. Even the companies
with quality internal controls will spend valuable resources on compliance. Id.
9. See Cunningham, supra note 4, at 917 (comparing the events leading up
to the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley to the events leading to the passage
of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934).
10. Hamilton, supra note 5, at 6. Investors from all walks of life were
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corporate America was generally positive, as investors enjoyed
However, the
substantial growth in a very bullish market."
public was unaware of the Securities and Exchange Commission's
("SEC") difficulty in monitoring corporate activity through this
12
incredible growth period.
3
In the spring of 2000, the American public had a revelation.'
Investors began to recognize that the markets were extremely
inflated, and consequently began selling off their investments,
causing a rapid decline in the financial markets.' 4 Then, only
eighteen months later, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001
sent the financial markets into a frenzy, creating widespread
uncertainty within the minds of the investing public.' 5 In the
aftermath of the attacks, the new war on terrorism took a
significant toll on the American economy and pushed it deep into a
recession.16
However, the worst was yet to come for the American
investor. Between December 2001 and July 2002, four major U.S.
companies filed for bankruptcy: Enron, Adelphia, WorldCom, and
Global Crossing. 17 Unfortunately, there was much more to these

getting involved in the markets, as the belief grew that the financial markets
could only go up. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 6 n.16. "Filings had grown from 61,295 in 1991 to 98,745 in 2000,
but the SEC staff had grown only from 125 to 161." Id. Other significant
events contributed to this "sweeping reform," such as the decision to allow
accounting firms to simultaneously sell auditing services along with
management and tax services, and the enactment of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 which made class action suits more difficult in
corporate transactions. Id.
The financial markets had
13. Cunningham, supra note 4, at 923.
attracted millions of people who had little investment experience but wanted a
piece of the action, so unsavvy investors continued to put money into the
market in the 1990s, regardless of the prices, and with no real strategy in
mind. Id.
14. See id.
(discussing public's realization that a financial bubble was
ready to burst). The bubble finally burst and panic set in, creating havoc in
the markets and causing investors to frantically pull their money out. Id.
15. Id. at 923-24 n.35. The New York Stock Exchange closed for a week,
while New York City and the world tried to make sense and cope with the
tragedy. Id. For the first couple of weeks the markets stood strong, but that
may have been purely a patriotic effort from a nation in mourning. Id. A few
weeks later the markets began a steady sell-off that continued for the next
year. Id.
16. See generally id. at 923-24 (describing the tragic events that led to the
incredible sell-off in the markets).
17. See Recine, supra note 2, at 1537 (discussing the effect of four of the six
largest corporate bankruptcies in U.S. history happening within one year of
each other). WorldCom was the largest corporate bankruptcy in U.S. history
with $107 billion in assets protected; Enron was next at $63.3 billion, followed
by Global Crossing as the fifth largest at $25.5 billion, and finally Adelphia as
the sixth largest with $24.4 billion in assets protected by the filing. Id. at
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bankruptcies than just a weak economy.18 All four companies
were involved in fraudulent accounting practices that "hid their
true financial conditions" from shareholders, creditors, and the
investing public. 19
Enron was the first in the line of corporate debacles and
currently has a long list of claims against it related to the financial
losses sustained by its investors and employees. 20 The company
was involved in extensive fraudulent accounting practices and
21
business partnerships that inflated its stock price dramatically.
When Enron was forced to restate its earnings and account for the
hidden liabilities, it reported enormous losses resulting in a free22
falling stock price.
There is evidence suggesting Enron employees lost over one
billion dollars due to the company's appalling practices. 23 Enron
had advised employees to purchase Enron stock in their
retirement plans, many of whom were wholly invested in the
company's stock. 24 However, Enron instituted a blackout period
that prohibited employees from selling their shares for a period of
time before earnings were restated. 25 Remarkably, there is

1537 n.10.
18. Id. at 1537.
19. Id. These scandals could not have come at a worse time for the
American economy. Id. The stock market was already suffering through a
horrible downward cycle, and that cycle was about to get much worse with the
uncovering of the most elaborate accounting scandals in U.S. history. Id.
20. See id. at 1540 (describing the pending litigation that investors as well
as employees have against Enron).
21. See id. at 1537-40 (discussing the impact accounting practices had on
Enron's stock prices). Arthur Andersen provided very aggressive auditing
techniques, and Enron created complex business partnerships and
transactions to place its financial statements in the most positive light. See
Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons From a Perfect Storm of
FinancialReporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39
CAL. W. L. REv. 163, 173-75 (2003) (discussing in great detail the Enron
debacle, and its ripple effect on Arthur Andersen).
22. Hamilton, supra note 5, at 10-11. The demise of Enron and the effect
the bankruptcy had on Enron employees and their retirement plans was
devastating. Id. at 11-12. Enron consistently used aggressive accounting
techniques that created complex financial statements that were at best
difficult to understand. Id. at 8. Even the most competent accounting experts
had a difficult time deciphering the statements, but finally it was discovered
that Enron was claiming that its revenues and profits were increasing when in
fact the company's position was declining. Id. at 8-10.
23. Id. at 10. Employees of Enron were heavily invested in company stock,
as the company had enjoyed fantastic growth since the company's inception.
Id. at 12. Also, Enron encouraged its employees to invest in corporate stock,
even while executives knew of the stock's outrageous inflation, suggesting
further fraudulent and self-dealing activity. Id.
24. Id. at 12.
25. Id. Enron employees watched their life savings vanish before their eyes
as the stock price plummeted. Id. There is evidence that suggests while
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evidence that Enron executives made hundreds of millions of
dollars by selling their shares during the four years prior to the
26
restatement of earnings.
Likewise, Adelphia Communications was involved in hiding
extraordinary amounts of debt, and overstating revenues and cash
flow. 27 The federal government charged executives of Adelphia
with bank, securities, and wire fraud. 28 To make matters worse,
the government also alleged that the executives of Adelphia used
the company's money for personal loans to purchase stock, pay for
extravagant vacations, and build a golf course. 29 Adelphia listed
30
$18.6 billion in debt when filing for bankruptcy.
Next, WorldCom's $107 billion bankruptcy filing was the
largest in United States history. 31 Executives of WorldCom also
allegedly filed false financial statements, which permitted the

employees were prohibited from selling their shares, executives were dumping
their stock. Id. at 11-12.
26. Nelson Antosh & Tom Fowler, The Fall of Enron; Execs Earned $600
Million From Stock Over Last 4 Years, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 8, 2001, at Al.
Right before filing for bankruptcy, the company made significant distributions
to favored officers and employees. See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 11-12
(discussing Enron's distribution of millions of dollars in retention bonuses and
stock awards just before the company filed for bankruptcy). Executives were
also selling their shares of stock before the restatement of earnings. Id. The
former CEO received in excess of $67 million, and other individuals received
payments of more than $10 million each. Id.
27. Deborah Solomon, Adelphia Overstated Cash Flow, Revenue Over Past
Two Years, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2002, at B5. Adelphia announced that it hid
at least $2.3 billion in loan guarantees for bank debt of corporate officers,
causing the stock to collapse and the company to file for bankruptcy. Id. The
founders of Adelphia were using the company as their "personal piggy bank[s]"
and were charged with looting more than $1 billion. Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Corporate Conduct: Prosecution;Founderof Adelphia and Two Sons Arrested,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002, at C1.
28. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Founderof Adelphia and Two Sons Arrested, N.Y.
TIMES, July 25, 2002, at Cl. The Rigas family members received $1 million in
"secret" cash payments each month, and also used company funds to pay off
$252 million in margin calls the family had accumulated at brokerage firms.
Id. The arrests were carried out in a very public manner despite the offers by
Id.
The government wanted
the executives to voluntarily surrender.
executives to know that it meant business, and that it was reacting to the
outrage of the American public. Id.
29. Id. The founding members of the company lost all control of Adelphia,
forgave $567 million in debt supposedly owed to them by Adelphia, and turned
over $1.2 billion in cable assets purchased with proceeds from personal loans
made to them by Adelphia. Id.
30. Id. Adelphia was the sixth largest bankruptcy filing in U.S. history. Id.
31. Recine, supra note 2, at 1542. WorldCom was the second largest long
Similar to Global
distance carrier and the parent company of MCI. Id.
Crossing, WorldCom's poor decision to invest heavily in fiber optic cable
initiated its demise, and caused it to falsely claim billions in profits. Id. at
1542-43.
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company to claim incredibly inflated profits. 32 As a result, the
stock price slipped from sixty dollars per share to less than one
dollar per share. 33 Incredulously, as WorldCom was in the process
of laying off thousands of employees, the company paid executives
34
in excess of $280 million in retention bonuses.
Finally, telecommunications giant Global Crossing was the
fourth major U.S. company to suffer an accounting meltdown and
contribute to the public's outrage. 35 Global Crossing filed for
bankruptcy protection in January 2002, stating that it owed $12.4
billion to creditors. 36 However, the CEO made over $735 million
from sales of his personal holdings, and built a $95 million
37
mansion in Los Angeles.
In addition to these major corporate scandals, various other
publicly traded companies admitted to misconduct and fraudulent
accounting practices.3 8 In many of these situations, executives
grotesquely took advantage of their positions by selling their
personal shares before they released the true financial condition of
their company. 39 Executives enjoyed millions of dollars in profits,
32. Id. at 1543. See also Sallie Hofmeister, Debt Puts Strain on Cable
Stocks; Telecom: High Cost of Operating and Improper Accounting at Some
Firms Weigh Down the Sector, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2002, part 3, at 1
(discussing how WorldCom originally reported a profit in 2001 of $1.4 billion
instead of a loss). Id. These types of accounting practices raised suspicions in
all capital-intensive businesses where there are alternatives for reporting
operating expenses. Id.
33. Recine, supra note 2, at 1543. The company's growth was stunted when
regulators would not let WorldCom buy Sprint Corp. Toby Weber, Sprint,
WorldCom
Nix
Deal,
at
http://telephonyonline.com/ar/telecom-sprint-worldcomnix (July 17, 2000).
The combination of poor investment decisions and lack of a new revenue
stream influenced WorldCom to massage the books.
34. Recine, supra note 2, at 1543. See also Louis Uchitelle, Turmoil at
WorldCom: The Workforce; Job Cuts Take Heavy Toll on Telecom Industry,
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2002, at C1 (discussing WorldCom's bankruptcy filing as
another crushing blow to an already battered American economy).
35. Dennis K. Berman & Henny Sender, Winnick May Kick in Funds to Aid
Global Crossing Rescue, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2002, at Al. Global Crossing
built a phone network undersea linking many countries and cities, and at one
time had a market cap of $48 billion. Id.
36. Hamilton, supra note 5, at 25. See also Cunningham, supra note 4, at
931 (discussing the formation and demise of Global Crossing). Global Crossing
was founded by a former junk bond salesman who took the company public
one year after its founding, and enjoyed an inflated market cap of $40 billion.
Id. at 930. However, two years later it was bankrupt. Id.
37. Hamilton, supra note 5, at 25. In two years' time, the CEO and founder
of Global Crossing created a $40 billion company, personally made $735
million from sales of his own shares, then filed for bankruptcy due to
fraudulent accounting practices. Cunningham, supra note 4, at 930.
38. See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 33-34 (reviewing corporate misconduct
that led to the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley).
39. Id. at 34. It was not just the big four bankruptcies that pushed the
federal government towards a comprehensive reform package; there was
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while shareholders, including the companies' employees, lost
40
everything.
Following these appalling corporate scandals, investor
41
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
confidence dropped sharply.
Greenspan stated that "an infectious greed seemed to grip much of
our business community... leading to a loss of investor confidence
in the markets."42 It has long been recognized that the primary
goal of publicly traded companies should be to maximize the
wealth of shareholders; however, recent events illustrate that
many corporate executives are much more concerned with
personal profit. 43 Executive self-dealing has contributed to the
demise of investor confidence, as demonstrated by the Dow Jones
Industrial Average hitting a five-year low in July 2002, causing
many Americans to lose most of the value of their retirement
plans .44

III. THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO THE CORPORATE DEBACLES
The American people voiced their outrage over the actions of
corporate executives. The Bush Administration realized it had an
45
angry electorate on its hands, and the cries for reform were clear
46
and could not be ignored. At the time, however, the only piece of
legislation in the congressional pipeline dealing with corporate
47
governance was the Sarbanes-Oxley bill. In the weeks before the
48
bill became law, few people gave it much consideration.
Interested parties had not seriously studied the ramifications of

additional fraudulent activity within corporate America that added pressure.
Id.
40. Id. Hard-working Americans were losing their retirement accounts due
to fraudulent activity and greed of white collar criminals. Id.
41. See Allen M. Putterman, Winning Confidence, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 18, 2002,
at 8 (discussing the need for quality accounting principles to restore investor
confidence).
42. Hamilton, supra note 5, at 34. Greenspan commented that the
character of corporate officers may not change, but the incentives and
penalties for misbehaving can change. Id. at 75 n.209.
43. Henry T.C. Hu, New Financial Products, the Modern Process of
Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV.
1273, 1277-82 (1991).
44. Jonathan Fuerbringer, The Markets: Stocks and Bonds; Stockgauges
Fall 2% or More on Job Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at C1.
45. See Recine, supra note 2, at 1544 (discussing the attempt to appease the
American people with high-profile arrests of Adelphia and WorldCom
executives).
46. See Cunningham, supra note 4, at 927 (describing the pressure the
federal government was under following the Enron scandal to create a new
corporate reform package).
47. David S. Hilzenrath, How Congress Rode a Storm to Corporate Reform,
WASH. POST, July 28, 2002, at AO1.
48. Id.
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the bill, 49 nor had Congress subjected the bill to the vigorous
legislative review that almost always attends complex, business50
related legislation.
However, the outraged public looked to Congress for answers,
pressuring Congress to enact a bill with limited information
regarding the potential impact on corporate America.51
Accordingly, President Bush signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act the same day it was presented to him,5 2 and he acknowledged
acting "amid public outrage at recent staggering stock market
losses."53 The political solution to the market catastrophe and
high-profile bankruptcies became the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 54
The Act was established "to protect investors by improving
the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made
pursuant to the securities laws. . . -55 The Act is expansive and
regulates many of the corporate practices that affected the stock
market and undermined investor confidence. 56 The Act modifies
governance, reporting, and disclosure rules for public companies, 57
and bolsters criminal and civil liability for securities fraud. 58 It
also creates a new oversight board for independent audit firms to
be paid for by stockholders of public companies, 5 9 embraces
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Hamilton, supra note 5, at 46 (discussing the legislative history of

the Sarbanes-Oxley bill).
52. Id. at 46-47.
53. Patricia Wilson, Bush Says Law Means "Hard Time" for Corporate
Crooks, REUTERS, July 31, 2002, at Al.
54. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 116 Stat. 745.

55. Id.
56. See Recine, supra note 2, at 1549 (reviewing the broad provisions of the

Act).
57. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 301-02, 401-09. These sections give the SEC
authority to direct the national exchanges and securities associations to
prohibit the listing of an issuer not in compliance with these sections of the
Act. Id. §§ 301-02. These sections also require auditors to be independent,
and set forth auditor responsibilities and authority. Id. §§ 401-09.
58. Id. §§ 801-906. Detailed provisions of the Act address: criminal liability
for destruction, alteration, or falsification of documents; non-dischargeable
debt if incurred in violation of securities fraud; the statute of limitations for
securities fraud; the sentencing guidelines for obstruction of justice and
extensive criminal fraud; whistleblower protection; the criminal penalties for
defrauding shareholders of publicly traded companies; enhancements of
penalties for white-collar crime; criminal penalties for mail and wire fraud;
criminal penalties for violations of the Employee Retirement Income
Securities Act of 1974; and corporate responsibility for financial reports,
including penalties for failure of executive to report or misrepresent. Id.
59. Id. §§ 101, 109. The Act established a new government agency, the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"), to oversee the
accounting practices of publicly traded companies. Id. § 101. It also describes
the duties, responsibilities, and requisite membership qualifications of the
PCAOB.
Id.
The PCAOB will be funded by monetary penalties, and
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restrictions on audit firms engaging in various non-audit services
for their clients, 60 requires internal control certifications by
61
and
principal executive officers and principal financial officers,
62
executives.
and
directors
to
loans
corporate
prohibits
The Act is not short on skeptics, however, in large part
because of how quickly the Sarbanes-Oxley bill became law. As
one commentator noted, the Act is "a telling example of the law of
63
One of those consequences is the
unintended consequences."
64
on small companies in America.
having
is
Act
the
effect
costly
The Act did not make distinctions between small companies and
the large corporations that were largely responsible for this
sweeping reform. 65 Many executives complain that the extra costs
accounting support fees collected from issuers. Id. § 109.
60. Id. § 201. Auditors of an issuer may not perform non-audit services,
systems design and
information
financial
including: bookkeeping,
fairness opinions,
services,
valuation
or
appraisal
implementation,
contribution-in-kind reports, actuarial services, internal audit outsourcing
services, management functions or human resources, broker or dealer,
investment adviser, or investment banking services, legal services and expert
services unrelated to the audit, and "any other service the Board determines,
by regulation, is impermissible." Id. However, pre-approval of services not
prohibited may be requested. Id.
61. Id. § 302. The Act requires the principal executive and principal
financial officer of an issuer to certify in each financial report filed that: the
officer has reviewed the report, the officer does not know of any false or
misleading information or the omission of information, the information fairly
represents the financial condition of the issuer, the signing officers are
responsible for internal controls, the signing officers have disclosed to the
issuer's auditors all significant information, and the signing officers have
indicated if the issuer has undergone any significant changes in internal
controls. Id. § 302.
62. Id. § 402. The Act addresses conflict of interest provisions, specifically
prohibiting personal loans to executives, unless: the loan is made or provided
in the ordinary course of the business of the issuer, it is of the type generally
made available to the public by the issuer, and the terms are no more
favorable than those offered by the issuer to the public. Id.
63. Gregory P. Joseph, Master Class: CorporateFraudAct, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
5, 2002, at B9. See also Cunningham, supra note 4, at 988 n.46 (stating that
Congress rarely names or designates companies within legislation,
particularly when it is as encompassing as the Act). However, Congress
mentions Enron and Global Crossing in the Act, and thus demonstrates
"particularized transgressions at named companies...
not systemic
infirmities." Id. "Given the source of legislative inspiration, it is perhaps
unsurprising that the resulting legislation is not the product of a reflective
social science orientation gauging the real needs or the cost-benefit
assessments of the proper response." Id.
64. See Murray Coleman, More Companies Exit Public Markets; New
Accounting Rules Get the Blame Burden for Small Companies, INV. BUS.
DAILY, Aug. 26, 2003, at A01 (discussing the expense of the Act). It is
becoming too expensive for new companies to not only attempt to go public,
but also to remain public, thus creating difficulty in receiving public financing
and growth potential to the level that only the public markets can offer. Id.
65. Jim Day, Sarbanes Boom Far from Over as Final Rules Take Effect,
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of compliance with the Act are crippling smaller companies and
driving them out of the market. 66 How much corporate reform is
warranted? At what point do the costs outweigh the benefits? It
seems "[t]he right dose of medicine for Goliath may nearly kill
67
David."
IV. THE

COST OF A HASTY REACTION

The Act materialized under circumstances that forced
Congress to rush to the aid of the American public. 68 Republicans
and Democrats were vying for positive public sentiment and
hastily adopted Sarbanes-Oxley in the midst of a poor economy,
numerous corporate frauds, and a stock market crash.69 In
comparison, the Securities Acts of the early 1930s were enacted
several years after the stock market crash in 1929.70
This hasty reaction caused Congress to give little
consideration to the Act's effect upon small companies. 71 Because
the Act does not distinguish between large and small companies,
the burden of compliance is weighing very heavily on smaller
firms. 72 Executives of small companies are more likely to perceive
CHI. LAW., Aug. 2003, at 62. One of the costly burdens companies are facing
derives from the provision in the Act that requires attorneys to report evidence
of violations of securities laws. Id.
66. Coleman, supra note 64. The cost of implementing the Act is forcing
many small "healthy" public companies to consider privatizing. Id. The added
costs and restrictions of the Act are forcing executives' hands. Id.
67. Greg Farrell, Accounting Costs Rising as Wary Companies Play It Safe,
USA TODAY, July 31, 2003, at 2B (discussing that the increase in costs to
small companies is a heavy burden compared to the cost of the Act for large
companies).
This burden is causing small companies to reevaluate the
benefits of being a public company, and forcing them to privatize. Id.
68. See Cunningham, supra note 4, at 941.
69. Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to CorporateFraud:
A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 46 (2002).
Professor Ribstein discusses the politics of reform legislation within the
securities markets, and how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was influenced by broad
political agendas. Id.
Democrats saw the corporate frauds as a way to
discredit Republican pro-business policy, and the Republicans were not likely
to fight the reform measures and appear to side with corporate criminals. Id.
70. Id. at 3. The time period between the 1929 crash and the Securities
Acts of the early 1930s gave Congress time to conduct research and extensive
hearings to formulate an appropriate solution, whereas Congress did not take
the necessary investigative actions before enacting Sarbanes-Oxley. Id.
71. Bill Deener, Cost to Stay Public Soars for Small Companies; Fees an
Unintended Result of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Accounting Experts Say, THE
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 20, 2003, at 1D. The CFO of Abatix
Corporation, a Dallas distributor of construction supplies, stated that the new
legislation will cost him fifty percent more to be a public company due to the
additional regulations. Id.
72. Peter Zalewski, Lawyers and Executives Have Spent Months and Money
to Comply with Strict Corporate Governance Law, and More Limits are
Coming, BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., July 21, 2003, at 11. The Act might
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the law's demands as costly. 73 It is much easier for large firms to
comply with the new legislation because they already operate
financial
under fairly strict guidelines or have more human and
74
measures.
compliance
capital available to incorporate
This section analyzes the provisions of the Act that are
costing small companies their public status. It discusses how a
one-size-fits-all regulatory scheme is causing small companies to
dip into shareholders' profits to pay for compliance, and shows how
amount of small companies to
the Act is forcing a 7significant
5
privatization.
consider
A. Small Companies May Not Survive the Cost of Auditor
Independence, DirectorFees, and Legal Fees
Congress addressed the role that outside auditors played in
the corporate scandals with rigorous regulation. Outside auditors
typically review a company's internal controls and financial
statements by running various tests and performing reviews of
76
Title II of the Act
management, technology, and procedures.
while Title III
auditors,
outside
for
guidelines
formalizes new
of the
responsibility
corporate
and
committee
audit
the
addresses
77
members.
Under Title II, outside auditors are required to report to the
78
Also, outside
audit committees on a variety of measures.

cause growth companies to rethink their IPO strategy and focus primarily on
the private sector for financing. Id.
73. Jo-Ann Johnston, Executive Enforcement, TAMPA TRIB., July 28, 2003,
Many executives of small companies believe that the Act is too
at 1.
burdensome, and claim there is no evidence that it is building investor
confidence. Id. Moreover, many feel "the new rules don't shield shareholders
from a minority of executives who might commit fraud." Id.
74. Day, supra note 65, at 62. The Act is hitting small companies harder
due to the "huge pipeline of new rules" that is increasing the cost to remain
public; namely huge increases in accounting, legal, and internal costs (loss of
management time). Id.
75. See generally Deener, supra note 71 (discussing the effects of the Act on
small companies).
76. Cunningham, supra note 4, at 946. Professor Cunningham believes
that the Act is not a sweeping reform with regards to new audit regulations.
Id. at 948. He relates the provisions to stock exchange rules approved by the
SEC in 1977 and also to reforms that went into effect in the late 1990s. Id. at
947. Professor Cunningham realized that "[flederalizing these as law is
significant, but reform is too strong a word to describe this move." Id. at 948.
The significance of federalizing these regulations is the costly impact on
smaller companies. Deener, supranote 71.
77. Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 301-308.
78. Id. §§ 201-209. Outside auditors are required to report to the audit
committee all critical accounting policies and practices, all alternative
accounting principles that they discussed with management, and they must
share with the audit committee any written material prepared by the auditor
for management. Id. § 204.
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auditors are now prohibited from providing various specific, nonauditing services to their audit clients. 79 The Act attempts to draw
a line for auditors to prevent compromising objectivity.80
In addition, Title III states that audit committees must
conduct the hiring, compensating, and monitoring of outside
auditors.8 1 The committee members must be independent, and
must certify in their financial reports that: (1) he or she reviewed
the report; (2) the financial reports do not contain any untrue
statement of a material fact; (3) the report fairly presents the
financial condition; and (4) the member has disclosed any
significant deficiencies in the design or operation of the internal
82
controls.
While the Act attempts to remedy an obvious problem that
was a major part of the corporate scandals, it now creates a
burden that may be insurmountable for small companies. The
new auditing regulations are causing migraines for these smaller
firms for several costly reasons.8 3 First, outside auditors charge by
the hour, and are working much more to comply with the Act.8 4
More hours means increased compensation for outside auditors.8 5
Second, auditors are required to sign off on internal control
systems for all public companies.8 6
However, many small
companies have only a limited number of employees, along with
either elementary systems of controls, or systems that are not
properly documented.8 7
These companies are panicking to

79. Id. § 201.
80. Cunningham, supra note 4, at 950. An audit firm is not deemed
independent if any company executive worked at the audited firm; no officer or
director may influence the audit report in any manner. Id.
81. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301.
82. Id. § 302.
83. Johnston, supra note 73, at 1. Thus far, the Act has not restored
investor confidence. Id. Investors are more concerned with the size of their
portfolios, rather than whether there are a few bad apples misleading
individuals. Id.
84. Deener, supra note 71. The Act lists requirements for companies
regarding their internal control systems, and the auditors must certify a
company's system.
Id.
Internal control systems include a company's
inventory tracking, financial records, and management responsibility. Id.
Small companies struggle to document their systems, and have to hire outside
help in the documentation process before they even send the financial
information to the outside auditor for certification. Id.
85. Terri Somers, Burden of Financial Reforms is Bemoaned; Companies
Trying to Find Way Through Maze of Regulations, THE SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., May 18, 2003, at Hi. Small companies are in a different position than
large firms because they do not have the manpower to address the additional
requirements of the Act. Id. The duties are passed on to management, and
companies lose valuable time that executives could be spending on purely
business matters. Id.
86. Deener, supra note 71.
87. Id.
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88
implement the necessary procedures to comply with the Act. The
new regulations are forcing companies to focus more on
implementing compliance procedures and paying for auditors,
rather than focusing on the primary objectives of the business
89
enterprise.
Third, companies are adding independent directors to their
boards to comply with the Act's mandate of appointing individuals
90
However, it is
who do not have business ties to the company.
to find
companies
becoming increasingly difficult for smaller
91
of
afraid
are
Individuals
qualified individuals to join the board.
92
small
More
positions.
the
to
the potential liability that attaches
companies are hiring search firms to locate qualified individuals to
serve as board members, but the candidates are very cautious in
accepting positions because the Act exposes officers to the risk of
fines and imprisonment. 93 Also, due to the explosion in the
number of shareholder lawsuits, 94 premiums for Director and
Officer ("D&O") insurance, which protects board members, are
increasing dramatically. 95 All of these variables add up to
drastically increased costs, because director fees have more than
doubled due to search firm expenses, lack of qualified candidates,
and auditing
the increased time required to perform accounting
96
premiums.
insurance
D&O
increased
duties, and
Furthermore, public companies' legal fees are increasing in
double-digit percentages.97 It has become necessary to obtain
additional legal counsel with adequate corporate governance
capability and expertise to revise committee charters, prepare new

88. Id.
89. See id. (discussing the damaging effects Sarbanes-Oxley is having on
small companies).
90. See Johnston, supra note 73 (stating that adding independent directors
to the board could potentially dilute the board's overall knowledge base).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Deener, supra note 71.
95. Johnston, supra note 73.
96. Tamara Loomis, High Cost of Being Public: In the First Months of
Existence, Sarbanes-Oxley Act is Doubling Cost of Complying with Law,
BROWARD DAILY Bus. REV., May 7, 2003, at A7. The Act was intended to set
the public at ease after numerous high-profile scandals occurred at very large
firms. Id. However, compliance costs have a drastic effect on small-cap and
mid-cap firms. Id.
97. FOLEY & LARDNER, THE INCREASED FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL
COST OF STAYING PUBLIC 12 (2004), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com
/nlj/051203costs-study.pdf (Apr. 23, 2004). The study, based on interviews and
surveys of corporate executives as well as reviews of proxy statements, found
that eighty-seven percent of corporate executives said their costs of corporate
governance had risen either "somewhat" or a "great deal" because of the new
regulations of Sarbanes-Oxley. Id.
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filings, and write codes of conduct. 98
According to a recent survey conducted by the law firm Foley
& Lardner, audit-related fees for small to medium-sized companies
increased anywhere from 28% to 35% from 2001 to 2002. 99
Likewise, the survey reveals that small companies incur the brunt
of the expense regarding director fees and insurance premiums.
Small companies were hit the hardest with 11% increases for
director compensation, and a potential 500% increase in D&O
premiums.100 These increases have forced small companies to find
other ways to compensate board members and pay the necessary
expenses to comply with the Act. 01 Additionally, the survey
reveals that legal fees associated with compliance with the Act can
easily range in the hundreds of thousands of dollars for smaller
companies. 102 Ultimately, it is the shareholders who pay for these
added compliance costs, 0 3 the same shareholders the Act is
designed to protect.
B.

Sarbanes-Oxley Also Impacts the Job Market and the Economy
Small companies are a vital component to the American
economy.104 They represent more than 99.7% of all employers, and
generate 60 to 80% of new jobs annually.'0 5 It is crucial to a
healthy economy that small businesses have the opportunity to
grow and prosper. 0 6 This is precisely why the economy does not
need a hastily-enacted piece of legislation that inhibits the ability
of smaller companies to grow.
Enforcement of the Act will cause the American employment

98. Deener, supra note 71.
99. FOLEY & LARDNER, supra note 97, at 5. Of the executives surveyed,
seventy-three percent said they believed the government's intentions were

appropriate; however, that was the only positive result from the survey. Id.
The study found the average cost associated with being a mid-cap company
drastically increased from $1.3 million to $2.5 million dollars. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Deener, supra note 71.
103. See generally Johnston, supra note 73 (evaluating the costs associated
with independent directors, audit fees, and privatization).
104. See generally Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman, Remarks Before
Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation (Sept. 22,
2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch092203cag.htm (last visited Mar.
12, 2005) (discussing the economics of small business and the importance
small business has to the American economy).
Ms. Glassman, the
Commissioner of the SEC, spoke of the importance of small business to new
jobs and a stronger economy. Id. There have been reports to the SEC that
small companies are having problems finding independent board members,
and that they may forego their public status rather than comply with the Act.

Id.

105. Id.
106. Id.
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market to remain in desperate need of jobs.107
The costs
associated with compliance are challenging CEOs and CFOs of
smaller companies to reevaluate their budgets for research and
development, 0 8 an area that typically creates the new jobs and
products that the American economy needs. 109 Furthermore, the
costs of compliance will also lead to small companies downsizing in
order to remain at a certain profit level, thus eliminating rather
than creating jobs.llO
Additionally, there is concern from CEOs and CFOs of small
companies regarding liability. Officers are apt to be conservative
with regard to making new investments and introducing new
products because the consequences of a failed decision might
include lawsuits and criminal sanctions."' Unfortunately, this
conservative approach to business will further lead to a slow
economy and a weak job market.
Large companies already have the internal tools necessary to
alleviate the burdens of compliance and have been able to adapt to
the new regulations." 2 However, small companies are forced to
hire expensive outsiders to help with compliance, 11 and the cost is
affecting business. Small companies play a vital role in the
American economy, and that role is being drastically affected by a
hastily legislated regulation that was not "thoroughly thought
' 14
through with respect to the downstream ramifications." "

107. Getting Real About Sarbanes-Oxley-Editorial,THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE,
July 2003 [hereinafter Editorial], http://www.findarticles.com/cfdls/m4070
/190/107204657/pl/article.jhtml (last visited Mar. 12, 2005).
The SEC
Chairman is quoted as saying, "I believe that the costs are justified." Id.
However, the Chairman recognizes the fact that the Act has unintended
consequences and that the SEC will revisit the law's impact, "but not for a
while." Id.
108. Johnston, supra note 73.
109. See Glassman, supra note 104 (discussing how important it is for small
companies to grow and thrive). The American economy relies upon small
businesses for a tremendous amount of jobs and products that stimulate
growth. Id.
110. Somers, supra note 85.
111. See Editorial,supra note 107 (stating in a letter to SEC Chairman Hon.
William H. Donaldson that the prospect of liability is causing executives to
avoid risk).
112. Tamara Loomis, Sarbanes-Oxley Burdens Small Companies, N.Y. LAW.,
Dec. 19, 2002, http://www.nylawyer.com/news/02/12/121902d.html. Executives
of small companies feel there is now a penalty for being public. Id. The Act
might have seemed reasonable at first glance, but the law does not distinguish
between large and small companies. Id. The public market is made up of
mostly small to medium sized firms, and the Act is proving very costly to
them. Id.
113. Id.
114. Somers, supra note 85. Corporate executives have communicated their
displeasure with the Act's "one-size-fits-all approach" to corporate regulations.
Id.
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C. Small Companies are Struggle to Determine Whether the
Benefits of Being a Public Company are Worth the Costs
Since passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, there has been a
twenty-six percent increase in the number of companies deciding
to relinquish their public status and privatize. 115 The costs
associated with complying with the Act are causing companies to
reevaluate the benefits of being a public company, and in many
11 6
instances are driving them out of the highly regulated markets.
The U.S. economy was built on the entrepreneurial spirit of small
firms, and has allowed them easy access to capital through public
equity.i1 7 However, now small firms are faced with the cost of
complying with the Act, a cost that may prove to be overly
18
burdensome. 1
Unfortunately, "the costs of compliance often have little or no
correlation to a company's market capitalization, making them
proportionately more burdensome for smaller or midsized [public]
companies." 119 According to the Foley & Lardner survey, the
average annual cost of being a public company has almost doubled
20
for small to medium sized firms, adding incentive to privatize.1
A private company does not sell shares to the public, and therefore
does not have the same level of responsibility. 12 1 However, widescale privatization could cause havoc in the capital markets

115. Farrell, supra note 67. The increased costs of compliance with the Act
are causing companies to rethink their public status. Id. Section 404 of the
Act requires public companies to adjust their internal financial systems,
examine those systems, and have outside auditors attest to the system
adopted. Id. Fortune 500 firms already have the resources necessary to
comply with these procedures, whereas small firms require consulting firms to
assist with compliance. Id. The skyrocketing costs of compliance are pushing
small and mid-size firms toward the brink of privatization. Id.
116. Do High Regulatory Costs Force Public Firms to Go Private?,
http://www.upenn.edu/researchatpenn/article.php?715&bus (Sept. 10, 2003).
The steps taken by Congress to increase the financial transparency of publicly
traded companies are causing companies to consider deregistering.
Id.
Comprehensive disclosure requirements are more appropriate for large
capitalization companies, and will probably help those types of firms raise
public equity. Id. However, the burden the Act places on smaller firms is
unnecessary and is causing more harm than good. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. David A. Stockton et al., Going Private: The Best Option?, NAT'L L.J.,
June 23, 2003, at 2, http://www.kilpatrickstockton.com/publications/downloads
JNLJNeilFalis6-30-03.pdf. More public company executives are evaluating the
private sector for their firms.
Id.
The never-ending regulations from
Sarbanes-Oxley have been adding to the frustration of small companies, and
the growing burden and risk of being a publicly traded company are becoming
too much to bear. Id.
120. See Loomis, supra note 96 (reviewing the results of the Foley and
Lardner survey).
121. Somers, supra note 85.
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22
because it would further decrease investor confidence.1

D. The Government's Response to the Unintended
Consequence: "It'sa Small Price to Pay"
Many of the objections to the Act were overcome during the
brief congressional debate over the bill.123 There were parties who
thought corporate reform would not change anything because
there would always be people who broke the rules. 124 However,
Congress pushed the bill through without much investigation, and
125
now smaller companies have to pay for the sins of a few giants.
The government's response to critics emphasizes that the cost is "a
small price compared to the billions of dollars and public
confidence that has been lost by consumers, investors and
employees."1 26 However, if Congress had known that the Act
would impose such an overwhelming cost to small companies, it
127
might have considered alternatives.
V. A SOLUTION

TO AID DAVID IN A WORLD OF GOLIATHS

Congress implemented the Act with the purpose of restoring
investor confidence in the markets by forcing public companies to
take
measures
to ensure
"greater accountability
and
transparency."1 28
Unfortunately, Congress did not have the
opportunity to investigate the potential consequences of such
"sweeping reform," and failed to differentiate among public
companies. 129 The Act is now proving to be very heavy handed
122. Do High Regulatory Costs Force Public Firms to Go Private?, supra note
116.
123. Somers, supra note 85.

124. Id.
125. Deener, supra note 71.
126. Somers, supra note 85. The spokesman for Senator Paul S. Sarbanes
discussed the government's reaction to the unintended consequence.
Id.
Additionally, Senator Sarbanes, one of the bill's authors, stated "[t]here may
be some impact on small companies that are thinking of going public.... But
this will bring home the understanding that if your stock is going to be listed
and able to be sold to investors, you're assuming some obligations and
responsibilities with that." Farrell, supra note 67.
127. Deener, supra note 71. Investors are the ones who will pay for this
expense, just as they paid for the scandals. Somers, supra note 85. 'The hope
now ... is that the Securities and Exchange Commission will create rules, or
Congress will revisit the legislation to try to make parts of it adjustable to the
size of companies." Id.
128. See Loomis, supra note 96 (discussing the reaction to the Foley &
Lardner survey). Many corporate attorneys across the nation have recognized
the survey's results as accurate. Id. The cost of compliance with the Act for
small companies will eventually gain the attention of the SEC. Id. The goal of
the Act is to protect investors through accurate accounting, but investors also
want positive returns. Id. The cost of compliance jeopardizes the main goal of
investing. Id.
129. See Loomis, supra note 112 (discussing the events leading up to the
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toward small firms.1 30
This section proposes a solution that will allow small
companies to survive as public issuers. The Act authorizes the
Accordingly, the
SEC to dictate guidelines for compliance.
authorization allows the SEC to implement an application
procedure for small companies that would evaluate internal
procedures as well as costs associated with compliance with the
Act in order to determine a possible exemption.
A.

The SEC Has the Power to Keep the Entrepreneurial
Spirit Alive in America

In the Act, Congress expressly gave the SEC the
authorization to promulgate rules "necessary or appropriate in the
public interest." 131 This flexibility allows the SEC to develop
132
procedures that may exempt small companies from compliance.
The current one-size-fits-all approach is proving to be too
burdensome for some small companies. 133 It follows that the
critical issue is not that the Act demands too much regulation, but
that it does not differentiate among firms; the right amount of
regulation may differ for a company the size of Enron compared to
34
a company that is just getting started.
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley). Various articles have referred to the Act as
"sweeping reform," and have said it "contains some of the most far-reaching
changes that Congress has ever introduced to the business world."
Cunningham, supra note 4, at 988 n.5.
130. See Mark Cecil, Sarbanes-Oxley Propels More Small Companies to Go
Private, MERGERS & AcQUISITIONS REP., May 19, 2003, at 1,
http://www.usbx.com/experience/docs/MAReport-SarbanesMay03.pdf
(discussing how the cost of compliance with the Act is forcing small companies
to consider privatization). Congress designed the Act to protect shareholders,
but it also creates a tremendous amount of expenses for small and microcap
companies. Id.
131. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201(13) (authorizing the Commission to
formulate rules and procedures to enforce and govern public organizations).
132. See Loomis, supra note 112 (discussing the SEC's authority to
promulgate rules under the Act). A former SEC counsel described the
Commission's approach to the Act's effect on small companies as a "wait and
see" attitude. Id.
133. See Bruce D. Knapp, Private Sector: With Regulations Looming, Small
and Midcap Companies Would Do Well to Go or Stay Private, PrTSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 26, 2003, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/pp/03238
/215129.stm (last visited Mar. 12, 2005) (comparing the advantages and
disadvantages in privatizing or remaining a public issuer). The added burden
of complying with the Act has forced smaller companies to consider
privatization. Id. Private companies are not only weighing the benefits of
becoming a public company, but now more and more public companies are
considering the benefits of becoming private. Id. "The prestige of being
publicly held has been greatly damaged by the barrage of corporate scandals."
Id.
134. See generally Do High Regulatory Costs Force Public Firms to Go
Private?, supra note 116 (discussing the process of deregistration).
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There are many critical characteristics of small companies
that make them vastly different to regulate in comparison to large
corporations. 13 5 First, a small company's stock is usually not
covered by major investment analysts because the value of its
stock is normally based on speculation, and not on earnings
history.1 36 Second, small companies rely on different advisors
(accountants, lawyers, and investment bankers) than do large
companies.1 37 Finally, the majority of small companies are headed
by an entrepreneur with different motivations than a manager of a
large corporation. 138 These differences illustrate that the Act's
regulations do not protect the small company investor; instead, the
costly regulations jeopardize the investor's return. 139 Therefore, it
is in the public's interest, and within the SEC's authorization, to
promulgate the necessary procedures to alleviate the burden the
Act is having on small companies.
B. The Application for Exemption: The SEC Has the Discretion
and Small Companies have the Burden
Congress implemented the Act in response to corporate
scandals among some of the nation's largest corporations.1 4 0 Small
Privatization may cause a reduction in the quantity and quality of relevant
investment and business information. Id. Therefore, the legislation passed by
Congress to increase the accountability and transparency of companies could
"backfire" if small companies turn to privatization. Id. The purpose of the Act
is to restore investor confidence, not to further demoralize the capital markets.
Id. See also Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 116 Stat. at 745 (stating the purpose
Congress implemented the Act).
135. See Letter from John C. Malone, Managing Partner, Malone & Bailey,
PLLC, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Dec. 31, 2002),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74002/jcmalone1.htm
(discussing how
small businesses are different to regulate than large businesses). Some of the
major provisions of the Act do not regulate a small company's affairs as it does
a large company's.
Id.
For example, the regulation of investment
management firms does not affect small companies because rarely do
investment analysts give opinions regarding a small company's stock. Id.
Likewise, the requirement of independent advisors effects small companies
differently than large companies. Id. Small firms use different auditors than
large corporations, and are more concerned with the cost of services. Id.
Thus, requiring small firms to employ independent auditors is a much greater
burden to small companies. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See id. (illustrating how a solution for large corporations is not
necessarily the same solution for small companies). Small businesses did not
cause the havoc that led to the hastily enacted legislation, therefore there is no
need to regulate them as large companies. Id. Small businesses should be
afforded "right-sized" regulations. Id.
140. See Loomis, supra note 112 (stating the SEC was not yet willing to
exempt small companies). See also Deener, supra note 71 (quoting Peggy
Peterson, a spokeswoman for the House Financial Services Committee). Ms.
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companies were not the cause of the legislation, nor did Congress
141
realize the consequences the Act would have on smaller firms.
Therefore, this Comment proposes an application process that
would enable small companies to apply for exemption with the
SEC. The application consists of three components: revenue,
current procedures, and estimated costs.
First, the application for exemption would be available to
companies with less than $50 million in revenue. Companies that
meet this qualification would submit an application for exemption
on a yearly basis, after they report their fiscal earnings. This
allows companies that are most affected by the cost of compliance
to apply for relief from the Act. 142
Second, the application would require the company to
describe its current auditing procedures and evaluate the process
used in reporting its financial disclosures. This section of the
application would allow the SEC to investigate the company's
financial statements and determine whether the procedures and
findings were sufficient for a publicly traded company. The
application, in a sense, would be an invitation for an investigation
into the company's finances, and would thus provide further
incentive for maintaining quality auditing procedures.
Third, the issuer would be required to illustrate the estimated
costs and the extent of the burden of complying with the Act. The
burden would be on the issuer to demonstrate that it should be
granted an exemption from compliance with the Act. The added
costs of auditor independence, director fees, and legal fees would
all be factors in determining the extent of the burden imposed on
the company.
In addition, the SEC should create a separate committee to

Peterson acknowledged the costs and impact the Act is having on small
companies, but believes the regulations are necessary due to the level of
scandals that preceded the law. Id. However, this seems to be further proof
that smaller companies pay for the mistakes of the "gigantic rogues." Id.
141. See Malone, supra note 135 (discussing the overly broad regulatory
scheme chosen because of large corporations' mistakes). See also Lin, supra
note 8, at 1 (reviewing concerns with the cost of compliance with the Act).
Unfortunately, the Act was implemented hastily. Id. Now, small companies
are faced with many compliance expenses that divert resources from other
areas of the company. Id.
142. See Deener, supra note 71 (discussing the burden the Act is having on
small companies). According to the Foley & Lardner survey, the average cost
for small to mid-sized companies to remain public will increase from $1.3
million a year to approximately $2.5 million, equaling a ninety percent
increase. Id. Many securities law experts believe that small companies suffer
because of the hastily enacted legislation. Id. A securities lawyer at Foley &
Lardner stated, "I think if Congress had known that this law would cost such
a large percentage of a small company's revenue, it would have rethought it.
People don't realize the financial impact on hundreds of smaller companies."

Id.
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evaluate the applications submitted and have the discretion to
grant exemptions. This would allow an exclusive division of the
SEC to focus primarily on the needs of smaller companies, and
evaluate whether an entirely different regulatory system is
warranted. 143
SEC Commissioner Cynthia Glassman acknowledged the
impact that the Act is having on small companies. 144 She realizes
if compliance costs discourage small companies from expanding, it
The
poses a serious concern to the American economy. 145
Commissioner inferred that the SEC is willing to adjust to small
companies' needs if there is a sufficient burden. 146 This proposal
a sufficient burden
allows small companies to present evidence of
147
and allows the SEC to act upon this evidence.
In addition, the application for exemption helps to balance the
purpose of the Act with the demands of small companies.
Specifically, the application would foster the Act's initial purpose
of investor protection while preventing smaller companies from
Further, the
becoming overburdened with regulations. 148
143. See Malone, supra note 135 (suggesting in a letter to the SEC that
small companies have separate regulations). A separate regulatory scheme for
small companies should also be monitored by a separate group of regulators.
Id. This would allow the focus of the group to be specifically on small
companies and the unique issues that confront them.
144. See Glassman, supra note 104 (emphasizing the SEC's recognition of
the impact on small companies). In her speech before the Government
Business Forum, Ms. Glassman spoke of the need for small companies to
inform the Commission about the struggles the businesses are having with
compliance. Id.
145. See id. (recognizing the importance of small companies to the American
If costs of remaining public are acting "as a disincentive to
economy).
expansion" then that is a "serious concern." Id. See also Do High Regulatory
Costs Force Public Firms to Go Private?, supra note 116 (discussing the
possiblility of the SEC's relieving the burden on small companies). The
American economy prides itself on the idea that smaller companies are able to
easily raise public financing; however, the cost of complying with the new
reform measures for public companies are proving to be too much for some
smaller companies to handle, and are forcing out new ventures. Id. One
option suggested by two professors from the Wharton School of Business is to
create multi-tiered equity markets, with each tier abiding by separate
standards. Id.
146. See Glassman, supra note 104 (discussing the importance of small
companies to the American economy).
147. See id. (suggesting that small companies need to express their
difficulties with compliance to the Commission). Cf. Katie Merx, The Burdens
of Proof; After a Year of Sarbanes-Oxley, Costs and Worries Start to Pile on for
Publicly Traded Companies, CRAIN'S DETROIT BUS., Aug. 11, 2003, at 11
(reviewing the impact the Act has had over the course of the year on smaller
companies). There are many small companies that believe their current
procedures and protocol are more than sufficient, and the Act forces them to
implement unnecessary and costly procedures. Id.
148. See generally Do High Regulatory Costs Force Public Firms to Go
Private?, supra note 116 (discussing how multi-tiered equity markets might
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exemption would allow small companies to promote new jobs and a
stronger economy by focusing on the growth of their business
rather than the cost of compliance. Lastly, the exemption would
promote the core values of our historically entrepreneurial society.
VI. CONCLUSION

The combination of extremely inflated stock markets, the
appalling events of September 11, and the corruption that led to
four of the largest bankruptcies in U.S. history, all helped spell
disaster for the American economy. The political solution to the
market catastrophe and corporate scandals was the SarbanesOxley Act.
The Act is very expansive and regulates many of the activities
that caused the corporate debacles and undermined investor
confidence. The Act is not short on skeptics, however, and is
commonly thought to be a law with unintended consequences.
Specifically, the cost of compliance with the Act is creating havoc
among small public companies.
Small companies struggle with the added costs of auditor
independence, director fees, and additional legal fees. These
added costs not only adversely affect shareholder returns, but
create serious implications for the American job market and thus
the American economy as a whole. The solution is an application
for exemption for small companies that would provide a balance
between the protection of investors and the need to avoid
overburdening small companies.

provide a balancing of needs).

